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Abstract— The changing power landscape introduces concerns 
about frequency management in a power system with significant 
amounts of non-synchronous sources of power. In islanded power 
systems like Great Britain and Ireland, electricity system 
operators are sometimes forced to undertake very expensive 
redispatch actions, including curtailing large amounts of 
renewable generation to meet statutory frequency stability 
constraints. Consequently, there is an imminent need to 
understand and quantify the limits that these constraints pose on 
the power system and develop metrics that can be easily 
integrated into current system planning and operational 
paradigm. This paper proposes three such metrics for 
quantifying the containment limits of a power system at a given 
operating point. The paper further argues that while the 
penetration of non-synchronous dispatch can indeed be used as 
the basis of a metric to define the containment limits of a power 
system, it does not account for variations in the contributions of 
other containment factors such as inertia. To address the 
aforementioned issue two alternatives are proposed: the first 
defines the containment limits of a power system without direct 
reference to penetration of non-synchronous power, instead it 
determines a relationship in terms of critical inertia. The second 
alternative improves upon the first and it considers the 
components of frequency stability constraints, offering an 
increased degree of flexibility in quantifying containment limits, 
and understanding the influence that certain key factors have on 
frequency containment. 
Index Terms-- Frequency Containment, Frequency Management, 
Frequency Response, Frequency Stability, Low Inertia, Non-
synchronous Penetration Limits.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
The market and favourable regulatory regime for 
renewables is driving power systems towards increasing levels 
of power delivered by non-synchronous technologies. The 
European Commission is pushing for increased interconnection 
to optimally utilize the potential of installed renewable 
generation. They have set an ambitious target of 15% 
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interconnection import capacity by 2030, relative to the 
installed capacity in a country [1]. This results in an increasing 
penetration of power delivered via non-synchronous 
technologies such as solar photovoltaic (PV) arrays, converter-
connected wind power plants, and high voltage direct current 
(HVDC) interconnectors that presents a greater challenge for 
islanded power systems like Great Britain (GB) and Ireland, 
where system operators are sometimes forced to curtail 
significant amounts of renewable generation to meet statutory 
stability constraints [2, 3]. In particular, following a credible 
loss of infeed or demand event, the rate of change of frequency 
(RoCoF) and maximum frequency deviation from nominal 
frequency must still be kept within acceptable bounds. 
Consequently, there is a need to understand the limits that these 
constraints impose on the penetration of non-synchronous 
generation in the power system, at any given time.  
At present, non-synchronous generation penetration limits 
in the GB system are defined in terms of inertia, which is 
calculated via the swing equation [4]. In Ireland, the non-
synchronous dispatch is managed using the System Non-
Synchronous Penetration (SNSP) ratio [5]. The Irish system 
operator, EirGrid, has an operational policy that limits the 
proportion of demand that can be met at any one time from non-
synchronous sources based on the SNSP, set in 2018 to 65% 
[6]. A key limitation of this approach is that it does not consider 
the variability of inertia in the power system. For instance, a 20 
GW scenario with 20% penetration of non-synchronous 
dispatch could have different amounts of total system inertia, 
depending on the inertia contribution of the synchronous 
machines connected to the power system at the time. The inertia 
is of great importance since it affects frequency behaviour and 
whether, or not, a credible loss event is contained within 
acceptable bounds. Although this can be addressed to a certain 
degree by applying the swing equation to determine the inertia 
limit, this expression only considers instantaneous RoCoF, as 
demonstrated by the authors in [7]. Furthermore, the SNSP does 
not account for variability in the amount, or type, of frequency 
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response services available at the time of the event, which can 
change from one operation scenario to another.  
This paper highlights the importance of rigorous modelling 
approaches to determine the penetration limits, as 
underestimating these limits increases the cost of meeting 
energy demand and overestimating the limits poses a threat to 
security of supply. Moreover, accurate determination of 
penetration limits is extremely important in informing the 
development of new operational policies and ancillary service 
products, to allow more non-synchronous renewables to be 
accommodated, reduce curtailment of wind power and imports, 
and meet objectives such as the GB system operator’s 
commitment to enabling zero carbon operation by 2025 [8].  
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• a frequency stability model is proposed and validated 
that includes a representation of the key attributes of 
the power system that influence frequency behaviour 
during a power imbalance; 
• proposal of a metric that, for a given demand value, 
provides the limit of inertia in the power system 
required to meet acceptable frequency conditions and 
RoCoF limits; 
• comparison of the metric with apparent limits of non-
synchronous sources of power required to meet similar 
acceptable frequency conditions and RoCoF limits; 
• proposal of a metric that individually considers RoCoF 
limits and acceptable frequency conditions, while 
providing flexibility to understand and quantify the 
impact of three key factors influencing frequency 
containment; and 
• demonstration of the proposed metrics using the 
frequency stability model for GB in 2025. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II 
discusses frequency management in GB, highlighting current 
response services, RoCoF limits and acceptable frequency 
conditions; Section III describes a frequency stability model, 
validated using a recent event in GB; Section IV presents and 
discusses three metrics for defining containment limits in the 
power system; and the paper concludes in Section V. 
II. FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT IN GB 
Power systems with an alternating current (AC) are 
intended to be operated within given limits for the frequency at 
which currents alternate. A rise or fall in system frequency is an 
indication of imbalance between generation and demand on the 
system that, if not addressed, is likely to lead to frequency 
instability and ultimately a blackout [9]. Demand for electricity 
changes continuously and automatic controls are used to 
modulate power production or consumption from a subset of 
generators, or large consumers, in order to regulate system 
frequency; and as the control signal is system frequency, the 
modulation is called frequency response.  In addition to natural 
variation in demand and generation, power systems are subject 
to unplanned disturbances such as fault outages of generators, 
interconnectors to neighbouring countries, or large loads. A 
common convention is that power systems are operated to be 
‘secure’ against any single fault event that is regarded as 
credible by holding sufficient frequency response to avoid any 
interruption to electricity supply [10].  
The European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Electricity (ENTSO-E) classifies frequency management 
products as: frequency containment, restoration, and 
replacement reserves, each being called upon one after the other 
following a disturbance [11]. In GB at the time of writing, the 
frequency response services include primary, secondary, 
enhanced and high frequency responses. Primary frequency 
response is equivalent to ENTSO-E’s frequency containment 
reserve, and secondary frequency response is equivalent to 
ENTSO-E’s frequency restoration reserve, while high and 
enhanced frequency response services operate across both 
containment and restoration timescales. With the exception of 
enhanced frequency response (EFR), these services can be 
dynamic or static. Dynamic frequency responses are response 
services that continuously track frequency deviations and 
provide the required active power response, while static 
frequency responses are frequency-triggered services that 
discretely respond to frequency deviations. Figure 1 illustrates 
the definitions of GB frequency response services and 
demonstrates how the services contribute to containing a 
credible loss of infeed event. Detailed definitions of the services 
are available in [4] and [12]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Current GB frequency response services [4].  
In GB, the electricity system operator (ESO) is required to 
set the operating state of the system such that particular sizes of 
single loss of infeed events do not lead to variations of system 
frequency outside certain limits detailed in the Security and 
Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS). These limits are defined 
by the loss risk classifications and a definition of unacceptable 
frequency conditions in [10]. Following a power imbalance, the 
GB ESO must also manage the RoCoF within limits defined by 
the Engineering Recommendation G59 [13], in order to prevent 
the undesirable tripping of loss of mains protection. It should 
be noted that, while the practical RoCoF limit in a future GB 
power system is likely to be 0.5 Hz/s, during operational 
scenarios that dispatch power plants with those RoCoF settings, 
or 1 Hz/s at other times, at present there remains about 2 GW 
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of distributed generation  using protection settings that could 
activate if RoCoF exceeds ±0.125 Hz/s [14]. 
III. A FREQUENCY STABILITY MODEL 
Identifying the penetration limits of non-synchronous 
power dispatch requires the use of detailed engineering models 
to assess frequency behaviour over a large number of scenarios, 
while also considering and representing the range of factors that 
influence frequency. Many of these models are highly complex 
and make wide-ranging exploration of particular issues 
extremely challenging [15]. Thus, it is a well-established 
practice within the sector to use a variety of simplified models 
to address particular phenomena, provided they have been 
appropriately validated in respect of those phenomena. Here, a 
‘single bus’ model, has been developed and setup to represent 
the frequency response of the GB power system, expanding on 
the principles outlined in [5, 16 - 19]. The ‘single bus’ model 
neglects the spatial distribution of generators and loads, and 
treats them as being connected to a single busbar. It is an 
aggregation of elements in the power system based on how they 
respond to frequency events, allowing for convenient 
representation of operational conditions and response providers 
whilst maintaining an accurate assessment of system frequency 
behaviour during a loss event.  The single bus model, illustrated 
in Figure 2, is built on a platform provided by DigSILENT 
PowerFactory [20]. 
 
Figure 2: Single bus model. 
A. Key Elements of the model 
Figure 2 presents the key elements of the model. The FSG 
(Flexible Synchronous Generator) and FNG (Flexible Non-
synchronous Generator) elements of the model are the 
generation elements that provide active power response to a 
frequency imbalance via controller actions. As a synchronous 
machine, FSG also provides an inertial response to the 
frequency event, while FNG does not. The ISG (Inflexible 
Synchronous Generators) and ING (Inflexible Non-
synchronous Generators) elements of the model are generation 
elements with no controller action in response to a frequency 
event, however, ISG does provide an inertial response. It should 
be noted that FNG and ING can also include interconnector 
imports when applicable to the scenario. Within the dispatch, 
an inertia constant of 6 seconds is assumed for all gas units and 
4 seconds for all other synchronous generators; these values are 
chosen following discussions with industry experts. 
The EFR and Static Response elements represent their 
corresponding frequency services, while SC allows 
representation of Synchronous Compensators. The Demand 
element refers to demand on the transmission system, i.e. the 
power exported to the distribution network, and includes 
pumped hydro, interconnector exports and net unmetered 
embedded generation. The default value for the sensitivity of 
demand to frequency is 2.5%/Hz [21]. The Embedded Inertia 
element represents the inertia associated with synchronous 
machines (generators and motors) operating within the 
distribution network. Based on discussions with industry 
experts embedded inertia is assumed to be equivalent to an 
inertia constant of 1.83 seconds as applied to the total 
transmission system demand. A loss of infeed event is 
represented by the LoIF element and a loss of load event is 
represented by the LoL element.  
B. Model Validation 
The model has been used to replicate the power imbalance 
experienced in the GB on the 9th of August 2019 as detailed in 
[22]. The public report of the event provides unusually 
complete details of the magnitude and timing of the loss events, 
the system conditions during the event and the magnitude of the 
frequency response that was provided by the GB ESO. The 
initial phase of the 9th of August event is simulated by applying 
these known parameters to the model alongside the underlying 
assumptions outlined above. Although the default assumption 
for dynamic primary response are its statutory requirements as 
defined in section II, in replicating the event, the speed of 
delivery of dynamic primary response is tuned given 
knowledge from discussions with industry experts that the real 
world delivery of the service usually slightly outperforms the 
statutory requirements. All other responses are modelled in line 
with their statutory definitions. The results of the simulation are 
compared with real 1 second frequency data from the time of 
the event in Figure 3.  It is found that the comparative frequency 
and RoCoF traces of the simulated event are in close agreement 
with the real system measurements which acts as a strong 
validation of the model’s ability to accurately replicate system 
frequency. 
 
Figure 3: Replicating the 9th of August 2019 event. 
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With the model tuned to reproduce frequency containment 
behaviour during a power imbalance that closely matches that 
seen in real system, the single bus model is subsequently used 
for the frequency management studies presented in section IV. 
IV. METRICS FOR PENETRATION LIMITS 
At present, the GB ESO sometimes has to constrain the 
largest loss risk to manage power imbalances within RoCoF 
and frequency limits [4]. It should be noted that other actions 
could be taken by the system operator, including any one or a 
combination of the following: curtailing non-synchronous 
power; increasing system inertia; or dispatching additional 
response services. 
In Ireland, a region experiencing similar concerns, the 
SNSP briefly described in section I is applied as a tool to 
manage the power system. SNSP is defined in (1), where ‘Total 
Demand’ includes interconnector exports.  
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑃 =  
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 (1) 
The SNSP limit is the SNSP ratio that if exceeded would 
lead to a breach of frequency and RoCoF limits, unless 
corrective actions are taken by the system operator. Since the 
penetration limit is dependent on RoCoF and frequency 
containment, the key factors influencing it are the frequency 
and RoCoF limits, the amount and speed of energy responses in 
the power system (including inertia), and the size and type of 
the loss that is to be secured. 
The following subsections consider the penetration limits 
derived for GB using the SNSP approach as defined in (1), 
alongside two alternative approaches. The model described in 
section III is used to conduct the studies needed to define the 
metrics. It should be noted that although the studies and results 
focus on GB, the methodology used to produce these metrics is 
applicable to any power system concerned with frequency 
management limits.  
Unless otherwise stated, the subsequent studies are 
conducted for operational scenarios in 2025 defined in Table I, 
using the tuned model from section III and the following 
additional assumptions: 
• the loss of infeed is simulated as an instantaneous loss 
of power supply such that frequency is contained 
within ±0.5 Hz of nominal frequency based on the 
normal loss frequency conditions as detailed in [8]. A 
loss risk of 1320 MW is chosen for the normal loss 
event as this is the frequency condition for a future GB 
power system [10, 23]; 
• demand is modelled as total demand in the power 
system including exports;  
• dynamic response services are simulated as defined, 
with 227 MW of EFR dispatched; 
• static primary and secondary responses are both 
assumed to be dispatched at 250 MW each;  
• it is assumed that primary response is delivered by gas 
plants in the FSG element of the model, and frequency 
is contained using the least response reserve holding;  
• the flexible synchronous generator is modelled as 70% 
loaded with 30% headroom for delivery of response;  
• no response from flexible non-synchronous generation 
is assumed;  
• generation background is based on the GB ESO’s Two 
Degrees future energy scenario in [24]; and 
• average availability of nuclear plants is assumed to be 
77% for older plants and 95% for the newer plants [25]. 
TABLE I.  THREE SCENARIOS BASED ON THREE ROCOF SETTINGS 
Scenario A1 A2 A3 
Loss of Infeed (MW) 1320 1320 1320 
RoCoF Limit (Hz/s) 1 0.5 0.125 
 
In constructing the operational scenarios, non-synchronous 
generation is dispatched first in the merit order, followed by 
flexible synchronous generation to meet the demand for 
primary response and securing the power system against the 
loss risk. Nuclear power is dispatched next, and any shortfall of 
power supply is met by dispatching the remaining synchronous 
generation.  
A. System Non-Synchronous Penetration Limit 
The SNSP metric, defined by (1), is applied to determine 
the penetration limits in GB, for the three scenarios presented 
in Table I. For each demand level, the amount of non-
synchronous dispatch is increased until the containment limits 
for the event, in reference to frequency conditions and RoCoF 
limits, are breached. The value of non-synchronous dispatch 
achieved before the containment limits are exceeded defines the 
maximum amount of non-synchronous dispatch that the 
scenario can accommodate.  
 
Figure 4: Penetration limits based on non-synchronous dispatch. 
The results are presented in Figure 4, showing the trends of 
maximum non-synchronous power dispatch for a given demand 
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level. The trend line produced for each scenario gives an 
expression for the SNSP limit in each scenario. It can be seen 
that at a higher RoCoF limit, for the same loss risk, the system 
can accommodate higher penetrations of non-synchronous 
dispatch at the same demand level when compared to the lower 
RoCoF limit. This is particularly true when comparing 
scenarios A1 (1 Hz/s) or A2 (0.5 Hz/s), for which there is little 
distinction between the calculated penetration limits, with A3 
(0.125 Hz/s). This is because as the RoCoF limit increases from 
0.125 Hz/s towards 0.5 Hz/s or 1 Hz/s, the dominance of the 
RoCoF limit as the key containment factor reduces in favour of 
managing frequency within acceptable limits.  
That said, when comparing A1 (1 Hz/s) and A2 (0.5 Hz/s) 
it can also be seen that at higher demand the SNSP in A1 is 
slightly higher than what is observed in A2. This is because at 
higher demand there is more contribution to frequency 
containment via the demand sensitivity characteristic. This 
factor, coupled with the higher RoCoF limit, permits A1 to 
accommodate slightly more non-synchronous dispatch in 
comparison to A2 at higher demand. The results for scenario 
A3, showing very low penetration limits, highlight the necessity 
for the removal of the existing RoCoF limit of 0.125 Hz/s under 
future operating conditions. Failure to do so would imply very 
large re-dispatch costs. It should be noted that plans are in place 
to phase out the Loss of Mains protection assets by 2022, some 
of which are RoCoF based and impose a RoCoF limit on the 
system [26].    
Although a useful metric for identifying the maximum non-
synchronous penetration in respect to containment limits, this 
representation of penetration limits is flawed. In particular, 
containment limits in terms of amount of non-synchronous 
power dispatched, is limited to the specific assumptions 
associated with the operational dispatch of the case being 
considered, i.e. the amount and speed of dispatchable (e.g. 
primary response) and inherent (e.g. inertia) energy responses 
assumed in the scenarios being considered. For instance, 
applying the limit of 4.75 GW of non-synchronous dispatch at 
a demand of 40 GW from scenario A3 (~12% SNSP), could 
result in an overestimation of containment capability if the same 
operational dispatch resulted in an inertia value less than what 
was used when defining the SNSP.  
B. Critical Inertia 
The limitation highlighted in section IV.A can be partially 
remedied by representing penetration limits in terms of critical 
inertia. In this case the inertia in the power system is 
progressively reduced until the lowest inertia required to 
contain the event is identified for a given demand level. This 
process is then repeated across a range of demand values, with 
the modelling assumptions unchanged from the previous study.  
The results presented in Figure 6, show inertia against 
demand instead of the amount of non-synchronous power 
dispatched against demand, where inertia in Figure 6 is the 
critical inertia required to contain the loss event, given the other 
energy responses that are available at the time of the event. The 
critical inertia is ratio, GVAs/GW, described by (2), where the 
plots in Figure 6 can be described as expressions defining the 
critical inertia limits for each scenario. This method produces a 
metric that defines the penetration limits by identifying the 
critical inertia for a given demand beyond which frequency and 
RoCoF conditions are breached during a loss event, i.e. the 
containment limit. 
 
Figure 5: Penetration limits based on inertia. 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
 (2) 
Upon considering scenarios A1, A2 and A3, a similar 
behaviour as observed in Figure 4 is seen in Figure 6, 
particularly in reference to the comparative trends of the 
scenarios. As with the Figure 4, in Figure 6, there is a marked 
distinction between the critical inertia trend line observed in A3 
(0.125 Hz/s) in comparison to A1 and A2. This highlights the 
previous assertion that the RoCoF limit is the dominant 
containment component in A3, with the dominance shifting 
towards frequency containment in A1 and A2. The slight 
difference at higher demand observed when comparing A1 and 
A2 is due to the higher RoCoF limit in A1 and the contribution 
to containment from demand sensitivity.    
Although this representation of containment limits 
improves on the failings of the previous, in respect to variations 
in inertia across similar penetration limits, it also has its flaws. 
It only addresses variations in inertia, making no improvement 
on variations in demand sensitivity and dispatchable energy 
responses.  
C. Containment Component Metric 
Defining the containment limits of an operational dispatch 
by considering the containment components addresses the 
limitations previously described, i.e. by separately considering 
penetration limits in terms of the energy responses that 
dominate RoCoF containment and those that dominate 
frequency containment. In this manner, RoCoF and frequency 
limits are treated as individual components of containment 
limit, as discussed in the rest of this section 
Identifying whether a scenario is likely to exceed RoCoF 
limits, can be done using (3) below, where the instantaneous 
RoCoF, g, at the inception of the event is a function of the 
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power imbalance ΔP, at nominal frequency 𝑓0, where Ht is the 
total inertia of the system for a given operational dispatch. 
𝑔 =  (
∆𝑃 ×  𝑓0
2 ×  𝐻𝑡
) (3) 
The total inertia of a system depends on the specific 
generation dispatch and the embedded inertia. Equation (4) 
captures the total inertia of the system using inertial 
contributions from inflexible generation (e.g. nuclear plants), 
flexible generation (e.g. gas plants) and embedded inertia (as 
defined in section III.A).  
 
𝐻𝑡 =  FSG𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠 + 𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠 + 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠  (4) 
The three components in the RHS of (4) are defined as 
follows: 
 
Equation (5) works out the amount of the dispatched 
synchronous generation (SGsupply) from the difference between 
total generation dispatch (Tg) and total non-synchronous 
dispatch (Tn). The inertia in MVAs of the flexible and inflexible 
synchronous generation elements are represented by FSGMVAS 
and ISGMVAS respectively, and defined in (6) and (7), where the 
percentage loading of the units (L1 and L2) defines the rating of 
the units based on the power factors (pf1 and pf2). The 
corresponding inertia constants HFSG and HISG account for the 
mixture of the different inertia constants by fuel type, for a 
percentage of the dispatched synchronous generation that is 
flexible (FGperc) or inflexible (IGperc). Equation (8) defines the 
embedded inertia in MVAs as the product of the demand in 
MW and the embedded inertia constant (Hembedded) in seconds. 
In order to provide an accompanying containment 
relationship for the frequency component, a range of scenarios 
are considered to produce a trend in terms of active power 
response and instantaneous RoCoF, denoted as g. To produce 
results in this format, a second set of simulation studies are 
conducted. It is assumed here that all frequency response is 
delivered by the enhanced frequency response service, and, 
with the exception of inertia, no other energy response is 
available to contain the event. In particular, the contribution 
from demand sensitivity is not considered at present but will be 
accounted for in future work.  
A constant demand level of 30 GW is chosen, while 
containment limits are assessed for a range of inertia values. It 
should be noted that a range of demand is not needed for this 
study, since demand sensitivity is not presently being 
considered and frequency response is only delivered by EFR. It 
should also be noted that, for the purposes of this study, in 
instances where additional inertia is required for a given 
instantaneous RoCoF operational scenario, additional inertia is 
provided by synchronous compensation. The resultant trends 
are extrapolated for a range of loss risk values, based on the loss 
risk frequency conditions in [10], producing a surface function 
that determines the EFR reserve that needs to be held to keep 
frequency within limits for a given loss risk and instantaneous 
RoCoF. The equations of the surfaces were determined using a 
least regret fit; meaning that the curve of both surfaces sit above 
the data points in the reserve axis. Therefore, the reserve 
determined for combinations of instantaneous RoCoF and loss 
risk values will be greater than or equal to the amount of reserve 
determined in the individual simulation study. This was done 
because a best fit without least regret gives some combinations 
of RoCoF and loss risk that would result in a prediction of 
reserve less than what would be observed in the simulation. The 
resultant surfaces are shown in Figure 6, with associated 
expressions shown in (9) and (10), and the values of the 
constants are shown in Table V. Equations (9) and (10) are 
expressions for the infrequent and normal loss risk conditions 
respectively. These two expressions represent the penetration 
limits for both loss risk frequency conditions, where g is the 
instantaneous RoCoF, ΔP is the loss risk, re is the EFR, and gth 
is the threshold for the applicable constants. Where g ≤ gth 
defines the lower bound and g > gth defines the upper bound. 
The upper and lower bounds split each loss risk condition, as 
depicted in Figure 6, into two expressions that describe both 
parts of the whole surface.  
Equations (3), (9) and (10) can be used together to first 
constrain the power system within the RoCoF constraint via (3) 
and then based on the resultant g, the frequency constraint can 
be determined using either (9) or (10), depending on the loss 
risk condition. This metric, expressed as a set of equations, can 
be used to determine the minimum amount of reserve that 
would need to be held, if EFR was the only energy response 
available to contain a given loss risk for an operational scenario 
at a given system inertia, represented here by instantaneous 
RoCoF. Similarly, the metric can also be used to determine how 
much inertia needs to be available for a given amount of 
enhanced response and loss risk value, or the maximum loss 
risk value for a given amount of inertia and EFR. Considering 
the limits to penetration in this manner, shows that the amount 
of non-synchronous power dispatched is not an inherent 
limitation to containment and frequency management. Instead, 
the factors most dominant are the energy responses available, 
i.e. dispatchable services such as EFR and inherent responses 
such as inertia, and the size of the loss risk. 
 
𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 =  𝑇𝑔 − 𝑇𝑛 (5) 
𝐹𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠 =  (
𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦  ×  𝐹𝐺𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
𝐿1  ×  𝑝𝑓1
) ×  𝐻𝐹𝑆𝐺 (6) 
𝐼𝑆𝐺𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠 =  (
𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦  ×  𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐
𝐿 2 ×  𝑝𝑓2
) ×  𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐺 (7) 
𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑠 =  Demand ×  𝐻𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 (8) 
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Figure 6: Surface plots for Enhanced response showing infrequent loss risks 
and normal loss risks both below (Lower Bound) and above (Upper Bound) 
the RoCoF threshold. 
 
𝑎5
𝑒 = {
𝑎1
𝑒𝑒𝑎2
𝑒𝑔 + 𝑎3
𝑒∆𝑃 + 𝑎4
𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑟𝑒 , 𝑔 ≤ 𝑔𝑡ℎ
𝑎1
𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑔 + 𝑎2
𝑒∆𝑃 + 𝑎3
𝑒𝑒𝑎4
𝑒𝑟𝑒 , 𝑔 > 𝑔𝑡ℎ
 (9) 
 
𝑎5
𝑒 = {
𝑎1
𝑒𝑒𝑎2
𝑒𝑔 + 𝑎3
𝑒∆𝑃 + 𝑎4
𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑟𝑒 , 𝑔 ≤ 𝑔𝑡ℎ
𝑎1
𝑒𝑔2 − 𝑎2
𝑒𝑔 + 𝑎3
𝑒∆𝑃 + 𝑎4
𝑒 𝑙𝑛 𝑟𝑒 , 𝑔 > 𝑔𝑡ℎ
 (10) 
 
TABLE II.  CONSTANTS FOR SURFACE EQUATIONS 
Infrequent loss risk 
Constant Lower Bound Upper Bound 
𝑔𝑡ℎ 0.3000 
𝑎1
𝑒 1.4420 × 100 6.5414 × 10−3 
𝑎2
𝑒 −2.1523 × 101 8.2146 × 10−2 
𝑎3
𝑒 −4.2483 × 10−1 −1.5089 × 100 
𝑎4
𝑒 6.4720 × 10−1 5.1913 × 10−2 
𝑎5
𝑒 −4.2336 × 10−1 −1.5091 × 100 
Normal loss risk 
Constant Lower Bound Upper Bound 
𝑔𝑡ℎ 0.5550 
𝑎1
𝑒 4.1135 × 100 −1.0878 × 101 
𝑎2
𝑒 −4.6323 × 101 −8.8867 × 100 
𝑎3
𝑒 −1.5332 × 100 −2.8890 × 100 
𝑎4
𝑒 1.7888 × 100 3.2090 × 100 
𝑎5
𝑒 −1.5267 × 100 −1.1907 × 100 
 
It should be noted that in power systems, the RoCoF 
observed by relays, such as Loss of Mains protection, differs 
from the instantaneous RoCoF value calculated using (3), 
which means that constraints using this method would be 
conservative in their assessment of the RoCoF component of 
the containment limit. In addition, the results presented in this 
paper consider EFR to be the only available dispatchable 
energy response service at the time of the event. This means 
that other energy responses would need to be equated to EFR, 
to determine whether or not the energy responses available, 
including those from other dispatchable services, e.g. primary 
response, would adequately contain the event. It should also be 
noted that in generating (9) and (10), modifications such as the 
inclusion of demand sensitivity or different frequency 
conditions would change the value of the constants presented in 
Table II, and a system operator applying this metric would need 
to first generate the expressions before they can be used for 
system management and planning. However, once the 
expressions have been generated, they can be applied to a wide 
range of operational scenarios without requiring further 
simulations unlike the other methods previously described. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A simplified frequency stability model is presented, and it 
is validated against the loss event in GB on August 9th, 2019. 
The results of the validation demonstrate the capability of the 
model to accurately capture the frequency behaviour of the 
power system. The need to understand the relationship between 
the penetration of non-synchronous power dispatch and 
containment limits are discussed, and the limitations of using 
the current SNSP metric is presented.  
The following are the key conclusions surrounding the 
subject of this paper: 
1. While a useful metric, a flaw has been identified in 
representing containment limits in terms of the amount 
of non-synchronous power dispatched. Specifically, 
the SNSP metric neglects the variation in available 
energy response for a given operational dispatch when 
comparing two otherwise identical SNSP system 
conditions. For instance, those two conditions could 
have very different amounts of inherent (e.g. inertia) 
and dispatchable (e.g. EFR) energy responses, 
depending on the operational dispatch. 
2. This flaw is addressed in part by using a representing 
of containment limits in terms of inertia. This 
improvement, however, does not account for variation 
in other forms of energy response that can change 
depending on the dispatch of the operational scenario.  
3. Separating containment limits into components of 
RoCoF and acceptable frequency conditions offers 
further improvement on the previous methods. 
Although the methodology will need to be followed to 
generate expressions before being applied to a given 
power system, the component method offers the 
potential for more flexibility in terms of understanding 
and quantifying the factors that contribute to the 
containment limits.  
4. The variations in inherent and dispatchable energy 
responses, alongside the size of the loss risk and the 
applied frequency and RoCoF limits are the dominant 
factors in defining containment limits, such that a 
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change to any of these factors influence containment 
and frequency behaviour. The amount of non-
synchronous power dispatched is not an inherent 
limitation to containment and frequency management. 
Further work is required to develop the containment 
components metric, and to compare the performance of all three 
metrics. In particular, the contribution of demand sensitivity to 
containment components metric will be included in future 
work. A means of equating energy responses will also be 
considered, allowing the expressions generated to be used in a 
tool that can consider the combination of energy responses 
available at the time of the event. Future work will also include 
expanding the SNSP and critical inertia into a 3-dimensional 
surface that can be used to determine the redispatch costs when 
these metrics are applied as a constraint on the dispatch of the 
power system. 
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